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Essay 
PARTY POLARIZATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
LESSONS FROM THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT† 
Neal Devins 
ABSTRACT—Congress paid nearly no attention to the Constitution when 
enacting the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. Legislative hearings and 
committee reports ignored the Constitution altogether; legislative debates 
largely did the same. This Essay both highlights Congress’s indifference to 
the Constitution when enacting the ACA and examines the reasons behind 
this legislative failure. In particular, this Essay advances three explanations. 
First, Congress is generally uninterested in “public goods” like 
constitutional interpretation. Second, the polarization of Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress further depresses Congress’s interest in thinking 
about the Constitution; instead, the majority party seeks to limit 
opportunities for the minority party to raise constitutional objections to 
legislation. Third, there is no federalism constituency in Congress that 
pushes lawmakers to take federalism into account when enacting 
legislation. For this very reason, Republican lawmakers almost always 
attacked the ACA on policy, rather than on constitutional, grounds. While 
embracing these three explanations, this Essay rejects a fourth explanation, 
namely, that lawmakers had no reason to know that the ACA would be 
subject to vigorous constitutional attack. Finally, this Essay argues that 
congressional disinterest in constitutional federalism supports the Supreme 
Court’s establishment of boundaries that limit Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power. At the same time, this Essay does not endorse the action–
inaction distinction advanced by five Justices in the ACA decision. 
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this project and for their hard work in improving the quality of my 
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†  Substantial portions of Part I of this Essay originally appeared in the Northwestern University Law 
Review Colloquy on March 15, 2012, as Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the 
Constitution When Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261 (2012), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/5/LRColl2012n5Devins.pdf. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When enacting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),1 
the 111th Congress paid scant attention to possible constitutional challenges 
to their signature achievement. No constitutional hearings were held, 
committee reports did not discuss the Act’s constitutionality, and legislative 
debates largely ignored constitutional objections to the Act.2 Why did 
lawmakers seemingly drop this ball? 
In the lead-up to National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (NFIB),3 various theories were launched and various culprits 
identified. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Michael McConnell argued 
that “[t]he drafters and defenders of the health-care law have only 
themselves to blame for this mess . . . [as] they did not take seriously their 
 
1  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
2  For a somewhat competing account, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and 
the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011). Professor Zietlow, looking at statements made 
on the floor of Congress about the constitutionality of the ACA, suggests that Congress did take the 
Constitution into account when enacting the ACA. See id. at 1395–1401. Professor Zietlow, however, 
does not examine the legislative process leading up to that floor debate. For reasons discussed in Neal 
Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011), statements made in the Congressional Record are an inadequate 
measure of Congress’s interest in the Constitution. See id. at 766–68. More than that, although Professor 
Zietlow does an excellent job showcasing the number of lawmakers who spoke about the 
constitutionality of the ACA, I nonetheless argue in this Essay that lawmakers were not particularly 
interested in constitutional questions when debating the ACA. 
3  132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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obligation to” interpret the Constitution and act within its bounds.4 In a 
vigorous defense of congressional Democrats that appeared in Salon, 
Andrew Koppelman claimed that the bill’s supposed constitutional 
shortcomings “could not have been anticipated because they did not exist 
while the bill was being written.”5 In both The New Yorker and The New 
York Times, news analyses placed responsibility on a confluence of 
factors—the fact that “liberal [legal] academics” thought the constitutional 
issue a nonstarter, the failure of the Republican lawmakers and media 
outlets to question the bill’s constitutionality, and the related failure of 
media outlets to run stories about potential legal challenges to the statute.6 
In earlier writings that have appeared in the Northwestern University 
Law Review and Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy,7 I have 
argued that party polarization contributes to congressional disinterest in the 
Constitution and that the ACA is a classic case study of the pernicious 
effects of polarization on congressional interest in constitutional questions. 
In the pages that follow, I will recap and extend that argument. Specifically, 
after discussing party polarization’s impact on constitutional deliberations 
and the corresponding failure of Congress to take the Constitution seriously 
when enacting the ACA, I will consider alternative explanations for 
Congress’s failure to take the Constitution into account when enacting the 
legislation. I will embrace two supplemental explanations—Congress’s 
general disinterest in “public goods” like constitutional interpretation and 
the absence of a federalism constituency in Congress.8 I will also examine 
and call into question a third supplemental explanation, namely, that 
Congress lacked the time to take the Constitution into account. I will argue 
instead that Congress was on notice of potential constitutional challenges to 
the bill, but that there was insufficient popular or interest group pressure to 
galvanize otherwise uninterested lawmakers into action. 
Following this assessment, I will close this Essay by shifting from the 
positive to the normative. In particular, I will consider the sensibility of the 
 
4  Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed., The Liberal Legal Meltdown over ObamaCare, WALL ST. J., 
May 25, 2012, at A13. 
5  Andrew Koppelman, Origins of a Healthcare Lie, SALON (May 31, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://www.
salon.com/2012/05/31/origins_of_a_healthcare_lie/. 
6  Peter Baker, Supporters Slow to Grasp Health Law’s Legal Risks, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, at 1 
(late edition); see Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/120625fa_fact_klein. 
7  Devins, supra note 2; Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution When 
Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261 (2012). 
8  The public good argument (which I shall embrace and expand upon) is advanced by Elizabeth 
Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001). 
For scholarship discussing Congress’s tendency to undervalue federalism (and the related absence of a 
federalism constituency), see Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
131 (2004), and John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89 (2004). 
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Supreme Court’s policing of Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause 
power.9 In NFIB, for example, the Court ruled that Congress cannot compel 
individuals to participate in the health care or any other market. In assessing 
the appropriateness of the Court constraining Congress in this way, I will 
argue that, similarly, Congress cannot be expected to self-police itself on 
federalism and that as a consequence, it is up to the Court to establish 
boundaries on federalism-related matters.10 
I. PARTY POLARIZATION AND THE ACA 
In this Part, I will make two points about party polarization. First, party 
polarization contributes to declining congressional interest in constitutional 
questions. Second, its existence helps explain Congress’s failure to think 
about the Constitution when enacting the ACA. In making the first point, I 
will focus on congressional committee consideration of constitutional 
questions. In extending the polarization point to the ACA, I will consider 
hearings, committee reports, and legislative debates. 
A. Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of 
Constitutional Questions 
Congressional hearings and, more generally, the work of congressional 
committees provide an important lens for understanding lawmaker interest 
in constitutional questions.11 Congressional committees, along with political 
parties, are one of the two “principal organizing structures of Congress.”12 
Hearings, moreover, are a relatively accessible source of information about 
Congress. Unlike informal contacts among staffers, members, lobbyists, 
and agency officials, hearings are public events. 
With respect to constitutional questions, congressional practices 
changed dramatically between 1970 and 2010.13 Although committees 
routinely considered constitutional questions for the first twenty years of 
that period, starting around 1990—and especially following the 1995 
Republican takeover of Congress—there was a notable decline in the 
 
9  NFIB also imposed limits on Congress’s spending power, holding that the conditioning of all 
federal Medicaid dollars on state participation in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion program was unduly 
coercive and therefore unconstitutional. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
Because the focus of my ACA case study is on the Commerce Clause, I will provide only limited 
discussion of the Spending Clause issue. 
10  At the same time, I will express my personal disapproval of the Court’s embrace of the action–
inaction distinction in NFIB. 
11  See Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in 
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 87, 87–88 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). 
12  John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era, in 
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009). 
13  See Devins, supra note 2, at 741–53, for a detailed presentation of the data summarized in this 
paragraph. 
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number of constitutional hearings. Indeed, while there were more than sixty 
constitutional hearings each year for most years between 1970 and 1985, 
there were fewer than forty constitutional hearings most years between 
1995 and 2010.14 During that same period, moreover, the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees became the only committees to regularly conduct 
constitutional hearings. This meant that the Judiciary Committees held 72% 
of constitutional hearings between 1995 and 2010, compared to 46% during 
the 1970s.15 
In making sense of these two trends, I think it is sensible to pay 
attention to the most obvious and recognizable development in Congress 
over the past forty years—the ever-growing polarization between the 
Democratic and Republican parties.16 The Congress that enacted the ACA 
was much different than the Congress of 1970. In 1970, with a strong 
contingent of conservative Southern Democrats, Democrats occupied every 
ideological niche. Likewise, there were several liberal “Rockefeller 
Republicans.” Indeed, throughout the 1970s, there was no meaningful gap 
in the median liberal–conservative scores of the two parties. George 
Wallace thus justified his 1968 run for president by arguing that there was 
not “a dime’s worth of difference” between the two parties.17 
Today, however, the forces that pushed Democrats and Republicans 
toward the center have given way to an era of ideological polarization. 
After Ronald Reagan’s presidential victory in 1980, the moderate-to-liberal 
wing of the Republican Party began to disappear. “Ronald Reagan’s GOP” 
pursued a conservative agenda that simultaneously isolated the liberal wing 
of the Republican Party and appealed to right-leaning Southern Democrats, 
many of whom switched allegiance to the increasingly conservative 
Republican Party. Computer-driven redistricting further exacerbated 
emerging polarization by drawing district lines that essentially guaranteed 
each party would win particular seats in the House of Representatives. As a 
result, Democratic and Republican candidates sought to mobilize the more 
 
14  From 1985 to 1990, there was no overall decline. The sustained decline (reflecting growing 
polarization in Congress) began around 1990. See id. at 743 fig.1. 
15  Id. at 750. From 1980 to 1994, Judiciary Committees held 56% of all constitutional hearings. 
Specifically, from 1985 to 1992, the Judiciary Committees held less than 50% of constitutional hearings, 
and the spike associated with the modern era began around 1992 (again reflecting growing polarization 
in Congress). See id. 
16  For an excellent treatment of party polarization in Congress since the early 1970s, see generally 
SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008). In linking party polarization to 
changes in congressional constitutional hearing practices, I do not mean to suggest that party 
polarization is the only salient variable in the number and location of hearings. As I explain in Devins, 
supra note 2, at 768–75, changes in the national policy agenda, changes in party leadership, court 
decisionmaking, and presidential action all impact congressional practices—so there is year-to-year 
variability in congressional practices. At the same time, party polarization explains the general decline in 
constitutional hearings and the related rise of the Judiciary Committees as the only committees to 
regularly hold constitutional hearings. 
17  Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at A1. 
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partisan bases that vote in party primaries, which pushed out moderates and 
rewarded candidates who were both more ideological and more loyal to 
their party. By 1990, Congress was transformed; a sharp, ever-growing 
divide between the parties replaced the equally sharp gap between Northern 
and Southern members of each party. This divide grew throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. By 2009—and continuing through today—the ideological 
distance between the two parties was greater than at any time since 
Reconstruction.18 
Party polarization, moreover, has resulted in a basic shift of power 
away from congressional committees and toward party leaders. “As the 
views of members within [each] party become more alike, the costs of 
delegating agenda power” to leadership diminishes.19 Leadership, for 
example, exercises greater control over the agenda and jurisdiction of 
committees. Leadership has also slashed committee staff and engaged in 
other reforms that have diminished committee influence.20 Leadership has 
also strengthened its own hand by engaging in message politics—party 
efforts to use the legislative process to make symbolic statements to voters 
and other constituents.21 
The interface of these factors largely explains the decline in 
constitutional hearings.22 With fewer staff resources and increasing 
intraparty agreement, lawmakers (outside of the Judiciary Committees) are 
likely to focus on policy issues that reinforce their party’s message and shy 
away from constitutional questions that cast doubt on the legality of their 
handiwork. More generally, lawmakers now have incentives to discount 
constitutional interpretation in favor of other pursuits—reelection, 
advancement within the party, and constituent service. By way of contrast, 
Congress was more apt to hold constitutional hearings in the less polarized 
1960s and 1970s. There was less pressure to pursue a party-defined 
message, and substantially bigger staffs gave committees the resources to 
consider a broader range of issues in hearings. Furthermore, committee 
 
18  Party polarization refers to the ideological distance between the average Democratic and 
Republican lawmakers based on roll call voting in the House and Senate. In calculating party averages, 
roll call votes are registered as liberal, conservative, or moderate. See Party Polarization: 1879–2010, 
POLARIZED AM. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://polarizedamerica.com/Polarized_America.htm#POLITICAL
POLARIZATION. 
19  David W. Rohde et al., Parties, Committees, and Pivots: A Reassessment of the Literature on 
Congressional Organization 12 (Aug. 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review). For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 2, at 756–59. 
20  For an inventory of institutional reforms that have shifted power away from committees and to 
party leaders, see Devins, supra note 2, at 757–58. 
21  See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001). 
22  The issues explored in this and the next paragraphs are drawn from Devins, supra note 2, at 759–
68. See also id. at 768–75 (noting that notwithstanding the general decline in constitutional hearings, 
there are occasional spike-up years typically tied to presidential initiatives, court decisions, and changes 
in party control of Congress). 
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chairs needed to reach out to minority party members to form coalitions, 
recognizing the fact that some members of their own party disagreed with 
their policy priorities, creating a greater incentive to pursue hearings in a 
bipartisan way and resulting in committees that were more likely to 
consider the constitutional foundations of legislation. 
To make these points more concrete, consider the relationship between 
the majority and minority parties in defining the content of congressional 
hearings. In today’s polarized Congress, Democrats and Republicans vote 
along party lines, pursue different agendas, and seek to advance their own 
messages while undermining those of the opposing party. For this reason, 
the majority party is increasingly unwilling to allow opposition lawmakers 
to challenge the constitutionality of legislative proposals. While legislative 
majorities have always controlled the policies and agendas of committee 
hearings, party polarization has nevertheless resulted in further limiting 
minority access to hearings. In part, the majority party’s increasing 
homogeneity squelches competing views and thus makes hearings more 
one-sided. Committee chairs can count on party loyalists to stick together, 
and consequently, there is less reason to reach out to majority or minority 
party members who do not necessarily agree with the chair’s agenda. In all, 
with party leaders exercising greater control over the agenda and 
membership of committees, committee chairs have both less interest in and 
less freedom to pursue issues that are inconsistent with the interest of party 
leaders. Against this backdrop, policy and constitutional objections to 
committee initiatives will likely come from the minority party.23 Yet the 
majority party may not allow committee hearings to serve as a vehicle for 
airing such minority party objections.24 
The Judiciary Committees, like other committees, are also polarized 
along party lines. Unlike other committees, however, the confluence of 
jurisdiction, member preferences, and interest group pressure has resulted in 
the Judiciary Committees’ continuing to hold constitutional hearings.25 
Moreover, with the general decline in congressional consideration of 
constitutional questions, lawmakers increasingly look to the courts as the 
last word on constitutional questions.26 
 
23  See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 142–43 (2004). 
24  See Devins, supra note 2, at 766–67. 
25  Most importantly, the Judiciary Committees cannot treat constitutional issues as second order 
largely because they have jurisdiction over civil liberties, constitutional amendments, and federal courts 
(not to mention the Senate’s power to confirm federal judges and Justice Department officials). 
26  Today’s Congress—as Bruce Peabody found in his study of lawmaker attitudes toward Court–
Congress relations—no longer thinks that the Court should defer to its constitutional judgments. See 
Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry 
into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 127 (2004); see also Devins, supra 
note 2, at 763–64. For additional discussion, see infra note 72. 
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In summary, congressional committees increasingly use hearings to 
advance the partisan goals of the majority party.27 With more intraparty 
agreement and fewer staff resources, committees generally focus on policy 
concerns and pay scant attention to the constitutional foundations of 
legislation. Correspondingly, the minority party is both more likely to raise 
constitutional objections to legislation and less likely to have access to these 
hearings. Outside of the Judiciary Committees, which continue to hold 
constitutional hearings, minority party members are most likely to express 
constitutional concerns through floor statements published in the 
Congressional Record and outreach efforts such as press releases and other 
public statements. 
B. Congress, the Constitution, and the Affordable Care Act 
For reasons I will now detail, the enactment of the ACA tracks general 
trends in Congress. Congress failed to take account of the Constitution 
when enacting the ACA. Indeed, the final version of the bill makes no 
reference to any of the constitutional provisions that potentially empowered 
Congress to enact the ACA—the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, or Congress’s taxing power.28 Democratic 
leaders did not refer the bill to the Judiciary Committees, and constitutional 
issues were not explored in any committee hearings or reports. 
Constitutional issues received limited attention in legislative debates, with 
some Republican members raising constitutional objections (and some 
Democrats responding to those objections). Party polarization may well 
have figured into this legislative failure. 
To start, the 111th Congress held forty-four hearings about the ACA 
between its January 2009 opening and March 2010 enactment of the ACA. 
Lawmakers, however, did not hold any hearings to examine the bill’s 
constitutionality. Also, although Congress specifically found that the 
ACA’s individual mandate “is commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce,”29 it did not consider the linkage 
 
27  For discussions of majority party control of hearings (including the tendency of the majority party 
to call witnesses to support predefined party messages), see Devins, supra note 2, at 766–67; see also 
Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill Van Alstyne’s 
Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1542–50 (2005). 
28  The statute does include findings that the ACA in general and the individual mandate in particular 
“affect[] interstate commerce.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). And while (as Chief Justice 
Roberts noted in his opinion upholding the individual mandate) “the constitutionality of action taken by 
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise,” it is nonetheless 
telling that Congress failed to reference the sources of constitutional authority that backed up the statute. 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller 
Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)) (internal quotation mark omitted). For further discussion, see infra note 
106. 
29  § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242. 
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between the factual record it was assembling and applicable constitutional 
standards. Instead, lawmakers seemed largely indifferent to a potential 
constitutional challenge to the ACA. Given the political import of the ACA, 
the number of policy-related hearings held on the bill, and the advent of the 
Tea Party (whose questioning of the ACA’s constitutionality proved 
politically salient to the Republican Party),30 the fact that the Constitution 
played no meaningful role in congressional committee consideration of the 
ACA is striking. 
Party polarization figures significantly in this story. First, for reasons 
just discussed, party polarization has led to a diminution in congressional 
interest in the Constitution. Second, with Republican lawmakers uniformly 
opposed to the bill, majority lawmakers worked hard to keep their coalition 
together. To accomplish this feat, Democratic leaders focused on policy 
priorities; hearings about whether the bill was constitutional likely would 
have hurt, not helped, their cause. Specifically, Democratic lawmakers 
could not risk any defections among their rank and consequently had 
nothing to gain by having bill opponents cast doubt on the constitutional 
bona fides of the bill. Correspondingly, recognizing the political costs of 
raising taxes, Democratic lawmakers (and the Obama White House) 
“absolutely reject[ed]” efforts to characterize the individual mandate as a 
tax.31 
The battle over the ACA was fiercely partisan.32 No Republican voted 
for the final bill in either the House or Senate. As a result, Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) needed to craft a proposal that would be 
acceptable to all sixty Senate Democrats so that the Democratic majority 
could invoke cloture and break Republican efforts to derail the bill through 
a filibuster.33 On the House side, Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Cal.) 
needed to secure the votes of 218 out of 258 House Democrats. Facing 
 
30  For a discussion of the Tea Party and its attacks on the ACA, see sources cited infra note 90; see 
also Zietlow, supra note 2, at 1395–1401. 
31  Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A14 (quoting President Obama). 
32  For two excellent overviews of the legislative process tied to the enactment of the ACA, see 
Health Care Overhaul Makes History for Obama, Democratic Congress, in 2010 CQ ALMANAC 9–3–9–
5 (Jan Austin ed., 66th ed. 2011), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=
cqal10-1278-70363-2371661, and Landmark Health Care Overhaul: A Long, Acrimonious Journey, in 
2009 CQ ALMANAC 13–3–13–14 (Jan Austin ed., 65th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Landmark Health Care 
Overhaul], available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal09-1183-59550-2251513. All factual 
claims in this and the next two paragraphs are supported by these two articles. 
33  Indeed, with the election of Republican Scott Brown to fill Edward Kennedy’s Senate seat after 
Kennedy’s August 2009 death, Senate Democrats needed to enact the bill before Brown took office so 
that Democratic holdover appointment Paul Kirk could vote on the bill. As a result, Reid kept the Senate 
in session for twenty-five consecutive days, with the final vote on the bill occurring on Christmas Eve 
2009. Equally striking, to keep Nebraska Democrat Ben Nelson in the fold, moreover, Reid needed to 
amend the bill so that Nebraska would not have to contribute any state funds to the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion. See infra note 86. 
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some resistance from moderates within the party, Pelosi made 
compromises, including an agreement to allow pro-life Democrats and 
Republicans to vote on an amendment prohibiting the use of federal funds 
for abortion services except in cases of rape, incest, and danger to the 
woman’s life. 
The fact that Reid and Pelosi made such compromises to hold their 
base together does not cut against earlier claims about the conformity of 
views within each party. While increasing homogeneity within each party is 
a hallmark of party polarization, party polarization does not foreclose some 
ideological variation within a party. Instead, party polarization speaks to the 
general conformity of opinion within each party, the growing ideological 
distance between the two parties, and the likelihood that party members will 
vote with their leadership and against the other party. No Republican voted 
in favor of the ACA; in fact, the party launched a nationwide campaign 
against what they derogatively called “Obamacare.” Democrats, on the 
other hand, overwhelmingly supported the measure and backed party 
leaders. Indeed, in the Senate, where all Democrats were needed to resist a 
Republican filibuster effort, the party voted as a unified block. 
The diminished status of congressional committees in the enactment of 
the ACA also supports earlier claims about the linkage between party 
polarization and the ascendancy of party leaders at the expense of 
committee chairs. Pelosi deployed three House committees to work on the 
bill: Energy and Commerce, Education and Labor, and Ways and Means. In 
the Senate, Reid turned to the Finance Committee and the Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. Reid and Pelosi then 
“assembled their bills from the measures reported by their respective 
committees, selecting from among conflicting provisions and tweaking 
them again and again to corral voters.”34 With respect to constitutional 
issues, it is telling that neither the House nor Senate Judiciary Committees 
played any formal role. Instead, policy-oriented committees—most notably, 
committees with jurisdiction over health and finance—pursued the bill. 
To make the connections between my earlier discussion of polarization 
and the ACA case study more explicit, I will now turn to the hearings, 
committee reports, and legislative debates that culminated in the enactment 
of the bill. As I will show, congressional committees paid virtually no 
 
34  Landmark Health Care Overhaul, supra note 32. No doubt, party leaders in less polarized 
Congresses have also tweaked legislation in order to cobble together a majority. At the same time, the 
fact that neither Reid nor Pelosi could reach out to Republican members is a hallmark of party 
polarization. When Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, Democratic leadership 
worked together with Republican leadership, knowing that Southern Democrats stood together to block 
the legislation. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 132–49 (1990). Likewise, congressional committees were more likely 
to consider the factual suppositions of legislation when Congress was less polarized, including the 
question of whether Congress’s commerce power supported the enactment of legislation. See id. at 87–
95. 
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attention to constitutional questions in hearings or committee reports. While 
there were occasional comments about the Constitution in legislative 
debates, these comments highlight the fact that minority members were not 
allowed to air constitutional grievances in the committee process. In other 
words, the ACA case study backs up the claim that party polarization 
contributes to Congress’s declining interest in the Constitution. Republican 
lawmakers’ unified opposition to the ACA highlights polarization in 
Congress and explains why majority leadership needed to resist all efforts 
to derail the bill, including the need to limit opportunities for minority 
lawmakers to challenge the bill on constitutional grounds. 
Twenty-two hearings tied to health care legislation were held in each 
chamber of Congress between January 20, 2009, and March 25, 2010, 
though none meaningfully considered the constitutionality of the ACA.35 On 
the Senate side, the constitutionality of the statute was raised in only one 
hearing.36 In that hearing, held in May 2009 by the Senate Finance 
Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) asked witness James Klein, 
President of the American Benefits Council, whether geographic variations 
in tax rates based on state of residence would be constitutional. Klein said 
that he did not know, but another witness—Edward Kleinbard, Chief of 
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation—said that he thought Congress 
could constitutionally permit regional variations in tax rates.37 Kleinbard’s 
constitutional analysis was not part of a prepared statement and takes up 
nine sentences in the hearing record. 
House hearings tell an identical tale. No witness testimony focused on 
constitutional questions, and only one witness answered a member question 
about the constitutionality of the ACA. In a September 2009 hearing before 
a subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) asked Michael Cannon, 
Director of Health Policy at the Cato Institute, whether the Constitution’s 
 
35  My research assistant Brian Kelley prepared a memo listing each of these hearings, including an 
analysis of Congress’s pursuit of constitutional issues in these hearings. His findings are summarized in 
Memorandum from Brian Kelley, Research Assistant, to author 22–29 (Aug. 4, 2011) (on file with the 
Northwestern University Law Review). 
36  Roundtable Discussions on Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussions]. Outside of hearings on health care 
legislation, the only other reference in Senate hearings to the constitutionality of the ACA was a 
questionnaire submitted by Senator Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) to Health and Human Services nominee 
Kathleen Sebelius on whether Congress had constitutional authority to enact the individual mandate. In 
her written response, Sebelius expressed support for the bill without addressing the constitutional 
question. See Nomination of Governor Kathleen Sebelius: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 92 (2009). 
37  Roundtable Discussions, supra note 36, at 137 (statement of Edward Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, 
Joint Comm. on Taxation). 
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General Welfare Clause supported the enactment of the ACA. Cannon’s 
equivocal response takes up just seven sentences in the hearing record.38 
That Congress did not explicitly consider the ACA’s constitutionality 
is only part of the story. Lawmakers also did not use the hearings as a 
vehicle to meaningfully engage in fact-finding that would strengthen claims 
that (1) the ACA regulates economic activity pursuant to Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power or (2) the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was 
noncoercive.39 Lawmakers likewise made no effort to link committee fact-
finding to Supreme Court decisionmaking. Moreover, while the evidence is 
more ambiguous, there is very little evidence in the hearing record that 
suggests lawmakers were interested in establishing a factual predicate for 
the idea of a national health insurance marketplace in which all groups and 
individuals must participate. Lawmakers, instead, were concerned almost 
exclusively with the technical provisions of the bill and how those would 
affect health care going forward. 
In examining congressional fact-finding, my research assistant Sam 
Mann and I looked at hearings in the 110th Congress (after Democrats took 
majority control of Congress in 2007 and held thirty hearings related to 
possible reforms of the health care system) and in the 111th Congress (from 
January 2009, when Obama took office, to March 2010, when Congress 
enacted the ACA).40 As noted above, no hearing explicitly referenced 
constitutional standards or specifically sought to demonstrate that all 
individuals—whether or not they purchase health insurance—are part of the 
national health insurance marketplace.41 Eleven hearings did, however, 
address the national marketplace, and we focused our attention there. Of the 
 
38  Between You and Your Doctor: The Bureaucracy of Private Health Insurance—Day 1: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 
139–40 (2009) (statement of Michael F. Cannon, Director of Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute). 
39  On the question of whether the Act’s Medicaid extension was noncoercive, a search of hearings 
and reports connected with Pub. L. No. 111-148 for [coer!] in ProQuest Congressional did not return 
any results relating to the ACA’s Medicaid provisions being coercive; the only mentions of coercion had 
to do with coercion of seniors by caretakers and aggressive marketers for Private Fee for Service (PFFS) 
plans. 
40  Sixty individual hearings were examined. (The transcripts of some hearings were not available on 
any of the major databases.) In other words, while our research is fairly comprehensive, there may be 
some limitations resulting from data availability. The research is summarized in Memorandum from 
Sam Mann, Research Assistant, to author (Nov. 2011) (on file with the Northwestern University Law 
Review). All factual assertions in this paragraph are drawn from this memo. 
41  One witness alluded to the Constitution when discussing the feasibility of a plan that included the 
individual mandate. Dr. James Mongan, in testimony discussing Massachusetts’s experience with an 
individual mandate program, said the individual mandate was “tricky” business because “there are some 
on the right who attack it because they do not even want to mandate motorcycle helmets, let alone 
premium payments.” Charting a Course for Health Care Reform: Moving Toward Universal Coverage: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 30 (2007) (testimony of James J. Mongan, President 
and Chief Executive Officer, Partners HealthCare). 
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eleven, seven were held in the 110th Congress and four in the 111th 
Congress. 
The overall focus of all of these hearings was the need for Congress to 
reform health care. On the questions surrounding the national marketplace 
for insurance, there was very little direct fact-finding. Lawmakers were 
primarily concerned with issues such as Medicare, expanding coverage, 
achieving the support of insurers, and eliminating waste in the system.42 In 
these eleven hearings that touched on the national marketplace, the 
committee members and witnesses often referred to subjects that could have 
proven relevant to constitutional litigation over the ACA—including 
expanding participation pools, the notion of voluntary markets, the need for 
universal care, and the economic benefits that a new nationwide system 
could provide. 
There is some testimony regarding problems with the existing system 
of state regulation, such that establishing a national health insurance 
marketplace would benefit the health care system as a whole.43 There is also 
testimony regarding the effect of decisions to opt out of the national market, 
usually made by the young and healthy, which leave the old and infirm still 
in the market with higher premiums.44 However, there is no testimony 
regarding the connection between mandatory participation and a national 
market. In other words, there are only bits and pieces in these congressional 
hearings that address the need for a national health insurance marketplace in 
which the young and healthy cannot opt out. There is, however, no 
systematic effort to explore this question or, more generally, to consider 
whether those who opt out of health insurance nevertheless remain players 
in the national health care marketplace. Congress’s failure to formally 
consider these matters—and, in so doing, shore up the ACA’s constitutional 
 
42  This is to be expected, given the power of the health insurers lobby and other economic interests 
impacted by the ACA. At the same time, Congress’s failure to consider at all the Act’s constitutional 
underpinnings is striking and highly suggestive of congressional disinterest in the Constitution. In 
particular, lawmakers could have asked witnesses to testify about the impact of the uninsured on the 
national health care marketplace. This testimony could have been useful to Department of Justice 
lawyers defending the statute. Moreover, there is no reason to think that calling such witnesses would 
come at a cost to majority lawmakers. Even if minority lawmakers questioned their analyses, these 
witnesses—so long as their fact-finding was methodologically sound—should have been able to respond 
to such questioning. 
43  See America’s Need for Health Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 34, 49 (2008) (statement of Stephen T. Parente, 
Director, Medical Industry Leadership Institute, and Associate Professor of Finance, Carlson School of 
Management). 
44  See Health Care Reform: Recommendations to Improve Coordination of Federal and State 
Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on 
Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 46 (2007) (statement of Steven Goldman, Comm’r, New Jersey 
Department of Banking and Insurance); Roundtable Discussions, supra note 36, at 542 (statement of 
Scott Serota, President and Chief Executive Officer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association). 
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foundation—suggests that constitutional issues did not register with 
lawmakers and their staff.45 
Congressional committee reports similarly suggest that lawmakers paid 
scant attention to the Constitution when enacting the ACA. Not one of the 
twenty reports issued by the 110th and 111th Congresses formally 
addresses the constitutionality of the statute.46 None of the four Senate 
Reports make any reference to the Constitution. In the House, institutional 
rules require “[a] statement citing the specific powers granted to Congress 
in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill.”47 Notwithstanding 
this requirement, eleven of sixteen House Reports make no reference to the 
Constitution. Of the five that do reference the Constitution, none does more 
than merely cite the House Rule and reference constitutional provisions that 
support enactment without substantive discussion.48 
Furthermore, committee reports show very little congressional fact-
finding overall, and they show no effort to link fact-finding to constitutional 
standards.49 Of the seven reports issued by the 111th Congress, most 
mention economic research on the need for health care reform. One of the 
seven discusses the linkage between the costs of the uninsured and the 
national marketplace. That report, by the Senate Finance Committee, cites 
“[c]ountless studies” about the economic ramifications of the uninsured—
that “23 percent [of uninsured adults] forgo necessary care every year due 
to cost” and that the cost for those that do seek care is shifted to the 
insured.50 
What is striking here is that the ACA is the signature bill of the 111th 
Congress—a bill that Democrats pushed once taking over Congress in 
2007, a bill that builds upon the failed efforts of the Clinton Administration 
 
45  Moreover, there is no reason to think this failure was at all calculated as an effort to steer clear of 
a politically volatile issue. For reasons noted supra note 42, majority lawmakers could have pursued this 
question with little or no political risk. 
46  Committee reports were identified through two separate searches, a LexisNexis Search and a 
Lexis/ProQuest Congressional search. Some reports were listed in one search but not the other, and the 
analysis in this paragraph considers all potentially relevant reports, even if one or the other search did 
not list a particular report. In other words, if anything, I overstate congressional committee references to 
the Constitution. For additional discussion from which this paragraph is drawn, see E-mail from 
Frederick W. Dingledy, Reference Librarian, to author (Dec. 12, 2011, 4:55 PM) (on file with the 
Northwestern University Law Review), and Kelley, supra note 35. 
47  JOHN V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-
162, at 626 (2009) (House Rule XIII, cl. 3(d)(1)). 
48  All five reference the Commerce Clause, three reference the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
two reference Congress’s taxing power under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
49  Information in this paragraph is drawn from Mann, supra note 40. 
50  S. COMM. ON FIN., AMERICA’S HEALTHY FUTURE ACT OF 2009, S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 2 (2009). 
In the same report, the Senate Finance Committee references the “hidden health tax,” where health 
premiums are increased in order to mitigate the “estimated $56 billion annually in uncompensated care 
to people without health insurance.” Id. 
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to transform health care in the 1990s, and a bill that “congressional 
Democrats and President Obama stake[d] their political fortunes on the 
outcome.”51 Against this backdrop, the failure of congressional committees 
to either consider the bill’s constitutionality or to formally engage in fact-
finding designed to shore up the bill’s constitutional foundation is stunning. 
At the same time, this failure is not surprising. The ACA exemplifies the 
ways that party polarization undermines congressional interest in the 
Constitution. The confluence of growing committee disinterest in the 
Constitution and the political necessity of holding the majority coalition 
together proved to be a perfect storm of the costs and consequences of party 
polarization. 
Congressional debates over the ACA reinforce this conclusion. With 
no opportunity to use the committee process to attack the ACA’s 
constitutional foundation, minority lawmakers turned to the floor of 
Congress to air their grievances. At the same time, declining lawmaker 
interest in the Constitution meant that policy—not constitutional—concerns 
were the overwhelming focus of ACA legislative debates. Furthermore, to 
the extent that minority lawmakers invoke the Constitution, they do so to 
derail legislative initiatives that they oppose on policy grounds. These very 
same lawmakers conveniently ignore the Constitution when their party is in 
the majority.52 
These debates over the health care legislation spanned 25 days and 
totaled 790 pages.53 Twenty-five entries explicitly discussed the 
constitutionality of the statute.54 Sixteen of these entries take up 
substantially less than one page in the Congressional Record. Of the nine 
entries that take up more than one page, seven contain articles that were 
submitted to the Congressional Record. None of the twenty-five entries 
discussed congressional fact-finding.55 
Perhaps more telling, to the extent that lawmakers considered the 
Constitution at all, they essentially ignored two of the three constitutional 
issues eventually examined by the Supreme Court in NFIB. Lawmakers did 
not meaningfully discuss either Congress’s efforts to use its Spending 
Clause power to expand Medicaid or whether the taxing power provided an 
alternative source of authority for the ACA’s individual mandate. On the 
question of Congress’s Spending Clause power to expand Medicaid, two 
 
51  Landmark Health Care Overhaul, supra note 32. 
52  See Devins, supra note 2, at 746–47 (noting a decline in constitutional hearings irrespective of 
which party is in the majority); id. at 766–67 (noting that, in today’s polarized Congress, constitutional 
objections to the majority party’s legislative initiatives are made by minority party lawmakers). 
53  Information in this paragraph is drawn from Kelley, supra note 35; Mann, supra note 40. 
54  Entries refer to headings in the Congressional Record. Most entries feature comments by only 
one member, but some entries feature statements by several members. 
55  Separate searches for the terms “marketplace,” “unavoidable,” and “voluntary” only turned up a 
handful of lawmaker comments regarding the idea of a national marketplace for health insurance. See 
Mann, supra note 40. 
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Republican lawmakers claimed that the Medicaid expansion was 
unconstitutional, but neither provided any analysis to back up that 
conclusion.56 Likewise, there was next to no discussion of the taxing power 
as an alternative source of authority for the ACA’s individual mandate. 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) was the only lawmaker to provide any 
analysis of Congress’s taxing power.57 
Even though lawmakers spent virtually no time examining 
constitutional issues when debating health care legislation, it is nevertheless 
true that Republican lawmakers—largely shut out in the committee 
process—aired their constitutional grievances on the floor of Congress. Six 
House Republicans and four Senate Republicans questioned the bill’s 
constitutionality in floor debates.58 The fact that so few Republican 
lawmakers spoke to the bill’s constitutionality (as compared to the very 
large number who spoke out against the bill in floor debates59) again 
highlights the currently polarized Congress’s disinterest in constitutional 
issues. Along these lines, it is not surprising that House Republicans 
scheduled hearings on the constitutionality of the ACA after the 2011 
Republican takeover of the House (around nine months after enactment).60 
In part, Republican leadership in the House had incentive to use 
constitutional hearings as a mechanism to reinforce claims that theirs is the 
party of limited government, thereby criticizing the purported overreaching 
of the White House and congressional Democrats. During the 2010 election 
cycle, House Republican leadership embraced Tea Party calls for limited 
government by explicitly questioning the ACA’s constitutionality and 
embracing a proposal requiring every bill to include language citing its 
constitutional authority. House Majority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) 
specifically attacked the “constitutionally suspect ‘individual mandate’” 
 
56  See 156 CONG. REC. H1856 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Deal); 155 CONG. REC. 
S13,718 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison). 
57  See 155 CONG. REC. S13,751 (daily ed. Dec 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy). In its Supreme 
Court brief, the Department of Justice suggested that the taxing power was subject to congressional 
debate, noting that “congressional leaders defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power.” 
Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 58, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 
No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2010), 2012 WL 37168, at *58. With the exception of Senator Leahy, however, 
no member did more than mention the taxing power without meaningful elaboration. See Memorandum 
from Amber Shepherd, Research Assistant, to author (July 2, 2012) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review). 
58  See 156 CONG. REC. H177–83 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2010) (statements of Reps. Garrett, Foxx, 
Broun, Gohmert, and Bishop); 155 CONG. REC. S13,821–29 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statements of 
Sens. Hutchison, Ensign, Hatch, and Kyl); 155 CONG. REC. H12,429 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement 
of Rep. Poe). 
59  As noted earlier, legislative debates of the ACA took up 790 pages in the Congressional Record, 
nearly all of which focused on policy—not constitutional—issues. 
60  The 2011 hearings about the constitutionality of the ACA were also tied to 2010 federal district 
court rulings that the ACA was unconstitutional. See infra notes 94–96 (discussing the role of these 
federal court rulings in the 2011 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the ACA’s constitutionality). 
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and, relatedly, argued that a requirement that all bills cite specific 
constitutional authority could create a valuable “obstacle to expanded 
government.”61 Following the 2010 elections, House Republican leadership 
likewise made clear that it intended to continue its campaign to dismantle 
health care reform. 
Two additional points bear mention in discussing the potential nexus 
between Congress’s failure to consider the ACA’s constitutionality and the 
Court’s role in placing limits on congressional power (as NFIB placed 
limits on the commerce and spending but not the tax power). First, for 
reasons I will detail in Part III, Congress’s interest in constitutional 
questions should be salient to the scope of judicial review on federalism 
issues. This does not mean that the Court was right to place the limits it did 
on Congress’s commerce and spending powers; it means that the Court 
should take Congress’s predilections into account.62 Second, even if 
congressional disinterest in the Constitution prompted the Court to reign in 
Congress, the Court should not invalidate legislation because Congress fails 
to hold constitutional hearings, fails to engage in constitutional fact-finding, 
or fails to meaningfully debate the constitutionality of legislation. There is 
no such thing as “due process in lawmaking,” obligating Congress to hold 
hearings or anything else. Indeed, legislative action leading up to the 
ACA—as well as findings in the ACA itself—highlight the impossibility of 
imposing due process demands on Congress.63 Most notably, the bill 
contains eight specific findings to support claims that the ACA’s individual 
mandate is “commercial and economic” and “substantially affects interstate 
commerce.”64 
 
61  See House Republicans Want All Bills to Cite Constitutional Authority, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 
17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/17/house-republicans-want-bills-cite-constitutional
-authority/ (internal quotation mark omitted). The rise of the Tea Party as a politically powerful 
Republican constituency propelled these constitutional arguments and initiatives. See Zietlow, supra 
note 2, at 1395–1401. 
62  See infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
63  See also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 
Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 400–06 (arguing that there is no “due process in 
lawmaking”). 
64  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). In its briefs defending the ACA, the Department of Justice 
points to these legislative findings—as well as roughly eighteen references to the national health 
marketplace in hearings, debates, and reports during the 110th and 111th Congresses—to assert that “the 
legislative record leave[s] no doubt that [the ACA’s individual mandate] . . . is a valid exercise of the 
commerce power.” Brief for Appellants at 25, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067), 2011 WL 1461593, at *25. Department of Justice lawyers 
deserve great credit for culling the legislative record to make as convincing a case for the ACA as 
possible. At the same time, the Government’s brief (which intersperses academic studies along with 
legislative record material) is ultimately a “legislative collage” as opposed to legislative history. Its 
collection of legislative findings, debate statements, committee hearings, legislative memos, and 
academic studies makes the best case possible for the ACA but does not counter, for reasons detailed in 
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II. BEYOND POLARIZATION: OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR CONGRESS’S 
FAILURE TO THINK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION WHEN ENACTING THE ACA 
In Part I, I explained how party polarization contributes to a general 
decline in lawmaker interest in constitutional questions and, 
correspondingly, that Congress’s enactment of the ACA exemplifies this 
larger trend. In this Part, I will consider three other factors that may have 
contributed to congressional disinterest in the ACA’s constitutionality: 
Congress’s general disinterest in public goods like constitutional 
interpretation; the absence of a federalism constituency in Congress (so that 
there is no interest group pressure pushing lawmakers to consider the 
federalism implications of legislation); and the fact that constitutional 
objections to the ACA were made late in the legislative process and, as 
such, lawmakers did not have time to seriously consider potential 
constitutional objections to the ACA. For reasons I will detail in this Part, I 
think the public goods and federalism constituency explanations are useful 
supplements to my claims about party polarization; I do not, however, think 
that timing concerns made it impossible for Congress to think about the 
constitutionality of the ACA. 
A. Congress and the Constitution 
Lawmakers have little incentive to independently interpret the 
Constitution. In particular, while all members of Congress have a stake in 
preserving Congress’s institutional authority to independently interpret the 
Constitution, lawmaker desires to seek reelection, gain status within their 
party, and serve interest group constituents overwhelm this “collective 
good.”65 In particular, a lawmaker who invests in constitutional 
interpretation “loses time for fundraising, casework, media appearances, 
and obtaining particularized spending projects in her district; she will thus 
be at a disadvantage [when seeking reelection].”66 
In explaining why “Congress is designed to pass over constitutional 
questions,” former Congressman and D.C. Circuit Judge Abner Mikva 
remarked that “the constitutional principles involved in a bill, unlike its 
merits, are generally abstract, unpopular, and fail to capture the imagination 
of either the media or the public. The Constitution is often portrayed as an 
obstacle to a better society by Congressmen forced to confront its 
limitations.”67 
 
this Part, the overwhelming evidence that lawmakers were not meaningfully engaged in constitutional 
analysis or constitutional fact-finding. 
65  Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 132, 144 (1999). 
66  Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1301. 
67  Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. 
REV. 587, 609–10 (1983). 
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Academic studies of lawmaker interest in constitutional interpretation 
bear this out. Consider, for example, the complementary work of Mitch 
Pickerell, Keith Whittington, and Bruce Peabody. Pickerell’s study of 
constitutional deliberation in Congress demonstrates that lawmakers 
typically advance a positive legislative agenda and, consequently, rarely 
have reason to discuss potential constitutional limitations; instead, 
lawmakers “first take their position on legislation based on their policy 
preferences, and then use all arguments possible to support that position.”68 
Whittington likewise calls attention to how it is that lawmakers benefit by 
making judgmental statements pleasing to voters and other constituents.69 In 
particular, lawmakers “can always take credit for voting the right way on 
the issue” and, as such, are unlikely to raise constitutional or other 
objections that cut against such “position-taking” behavior.70 Peabody’s 
study (surveying lawmakers’ attitudes towards Court–Congress relations) 
highlights two related phenomena, namely, (1) the legal issues that matter 
to lawmakers concern “local and electorally salient matters” and (2) more 
than 70% of lawmaker respondents said the courts should give little or no 
weight to congressional judgments about the constitutionality of 
legislation.71 In other words, lawmakers care about reelection; they do not 
defend their institutional prerogatives to interpret the Constitution but, 
instead, defer to the courts.72 
Party polarization, for the reasons discussed in Part I, exacerbates 
Congress’s general disinclination to engage in constitutional issues. 
Majority party leaders do not want to allow the opposition party to raise 
constitutional objections to their proposals; committee chairs have fewer 
staff to pursue such issues and less interest in reaching across the aisle to 
build bipartisan coalitions with the minority party. Correspondingly, with 
party members adhering to leadership-defined priorities, there is no reason 
to accommodate dissenters within the majority party. 
Congress’s failure to consider the constitutionality of the ACA, 
undoubtedly, is tied to both polarization and to the fact that constitutional 
interpretation is the type of collective good that lawmakers discount in the 
pursuit of their preferred policies and reelection. For reasons I will now 
detail, the absence of a federalism constituency in Congress also 
 
68  PICKERILL, supra note 23, at 143–44. 
69  Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 
51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001). 
70  Id. at 513. Whittington cites the Violence Against Women Act and the Gun Free School Zone Act 
as examples of “position-taking” behavior. See id. 
71  Peabody, supra note 26, at 147, 151. 
72  See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–65 (1999) 
(arguing that legislators—knowing that courts will check their errors—have little incentive to enact only 
constitutionally permissible statutes); Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On 
the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 440–47 (2001) (highlighting various ways that 
Congress signals to the Supreme Court that it embraces judicial supremacy). 
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contributed to Congress’s failure to consider the constitutionality of the 
ACA. 
B. Federalism and the Failure of Interest Group Politics 
There is no federalism constituency in Congress. Interest groups and 
voters are interested in first-order policy preferences; the question of 
whether favored policies are pursued by Congress or the states matters little 
to voters and interest groups. Indeed, interest groups have incentive to 
pursue nationwide initiatives. Rather than seek reform in fifty different 
states, national solutions cement interest group preferences in ways that are 
more pervasive and more efficient (national solutions cost less money and 
take less time to pursue than state by state reforms).73 Moreover, state and 
local interests often benefit from national programs, and consequently, 
states and localities do not serve as a bulwark protecting state prerogatives 
from Congress’s nationalistic tendencies.74 
In previous writings, I have looked at judicial confirmation hearings, 
party platforms, interest group web pages, opinion polls, and lawmaker 
commentary on Supreme Court federalism decisions to detail how 
uninterested today’s Congress and interest groups are in federalism qua 
federalism.75 This disinterest tracks historical patterns. In particular, rather 
than adhere to a consistent position on federalism, Americans have always 
let their views on first-order policy priorities dictate their views on 
federalism. Here are a few examples: When fighting over the Louisiana 
Purchase, Northern Federalists, who typically advocated for federal power, 
and Jeffersonians, who usually supported states’ rights, flipped their normal 
positions to pursue favored policies. During the Civil War, abolitionists 
(who had earlier opposed fugitive slave laws on states’ rights grounds) 
embraced nationalistic solutions and proslavery forces embraced states’ 
rights arguments. Similarly, before workers could turn to the federal 
government during the New Deal, turn-of-the-century progressives “strove 
to curb the power of entrenched corporate wealth.”76 More recently, 
Republicans who ran on the anti-big-government “Contract with America” 
pursued national standards on tort reform, telecommunications reform, and 
numerous criminal law initiatives. 
 
73  See William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 (1998). 
74  See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 8. 
75  See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1194–1200 (2001); Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: 
Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not the 
Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1318–24 (2002); Devins, supra note 8. Examples for the 
balance of this paragraph are drawn from id. at 134–37. 
76  Eugene D. Genovese, Getting States’ Rights Right, ATLANTIC (March 2001), http://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/03/getting-states-rights-right/302133/. 
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In addition to the flipping of positions by interest groups and elected 
officials, it is sometimes the case that elected officials simply ignore 
federalism concerns—as no interest group is pushing Congress to take 
federalism into account when enacting legislation. Consider, for example, 
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA).77 To start, pro-choice and 
pro-life interests sometimes support and other times oppose laws that seek 
national solutions to abortion-related issues. For example, pro-choice and 
pro-life interests divide over the PBABA and freedom of choice legislation. 
That division has nothing to do with federalism, as both measures are 
propelled by an expansive view of congressional power. With no obvious 
benefit to be derived from embracing a broad or narrow view of 
congressional power, pro-choice and pro-life interest groups see federalism 
as a second-order issue that is of next to no relevance to them. That is why 
lawmakers largely ignored federalism concerns when enacting the PBABA 
in 2003—even though lawmakers were on notice that Congress might not 
have authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate which medical 
procedures women can use to terminate late-term pregnancies.78 Instead, 
pro-choice and pro-life lawmakers and interest groups appealed to their 
base by engaging in the moral and legal debate about the right to choose, 
not the mundane issue of whether the PBABA was an “economic” 
regulation. 
The ACA seems cut from a similar cloth. No federalism constituency 
pushed for federalism-related hearings, and legislative debates focused 
almost exclusively on policy, not constitutional, questions.79 No lawmaker 
discussed congressional fact-finding when discussing the Act’s 
constitutionality; Republican lawmakers’ attacks against the bill focused 
almost exclusively on policy concerns, suggesting that these lawmakers saw 
little political gain in arguing that the bill was constitutionally flawed.80 And 
while party polarization helps explain the absence of congressional hearings 
to assess the constitutionality of the ACA, the absence of a federalism 
constituency also explains this failure. Likewise, the failure of minority 
party lawmakers to use legislative debates to launch a constitutional attack 
 
77  This paragraph is drawn from Neal Devins, How Congress Paved the Way for the Rehnquist 
Court’s Federalism Revival: Lessons from the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. 
LEGAL COMMENT. 461, 465–68 (2007). 
78  Specifically, the federalism issue had been raised in 1995 hearings, in law review articles, and in 
opinion pieces published by the Washington Post and the National Review. Nevertheless, with the 
exception of Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Representative Ron Paul (R-Tex.), lawmakers did not 
consider the law’s federalism implications when enacting it. See id. at 466. The House Committee 
Report does include a brief discussion of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, although dissenting 
Democrats made no mention of the Commerce Clause in their “dissenting views.” See H.R. REP. NO. 
108-58, at 23–26 (2003). Moreover, with the exception of one passing reference to the federalism issue, 
committee hearings ignore the Commerce Clause issue. See Devins, supra note 77, at 466–67. 
79  See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. 
80  See supra notes 58–59. 
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on the bill seems a function of both congressional disinterest in the 
Constitution and the absence of a federalism constituency. 
C. Did Congress Have Reason to Think that the Individual Mandate Might 
Be Unconstitutional? 
Congress’s disinclination to assess the underlying constitutionality of 
federalism-related legislation is certainly linked to party polarization, the 
lack of a federalism constituency, and Congress’s general disinterest in 
public goods like constitutional interpretation. At the same time, lawmakers 
are not seers and they should not be expected to anticipate arguments that 
do not exist when legislation is crafted. For this very reason, Andrew 
Koppelman argues that Congress did not consider constitutional attacks to 
the ACA because bill opponents failed to raise serious Commerce Clause 
objections in time for lawmakers to take those objections into account.81 
Claiming that these objections to the bill were not fully developed until the 
fall of 2009, “quite late in the legislative process,” the “constitutional limits 
that the bill supposedly disregarded could not have been anticipated 
because they did not exist while the bill was being written.”82 
This claim is not frivolous. Commerce Clause objections to the bill 
were not meaningfully launched until July 2009, and these objections were 
not fully developed until late fall 2009 (around the time that Congress was 
completing hearings on the ACA).83 At the same time, Congress was 
certainly “on notice” in the summer of 2009 that the individual mandate 
would be subject to a vigorous constitutional attack. Moreover, Congress’s 
failure to engage in constitutional fact-finding was a byproduct of 
legislative disinterest, not the failure of Act opponents to launch timely 
complaints about the ACA.84 Indeed, for reasons I will now detail, 
Congress’s failure was not tied to notice; it was tied, instead, to issue 
 
81  Koppelman, supra note 5. 
82  Id. It is unclear whether Congress was on notice with respect to Spending Clause objections. This 
was essentially a nonissue in the press and among academic commentators; moreover, as noted above, 
only two lawmakers made any reference to it in legislative debates. See supra note 55. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court had never ruled that an exercise of the Spending Clause was unconstitutional because it 
was unduly coercive. See Aziz Huq, In the Healthcare Decision, a Hidden Threat?, NATION (June 29, 
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/168677/healthcare-decision-hidden-threat# (suggesting that 
Spending Clause ruling was unprecedented and unexpected). At the same time, the Court had put 
Congress on notice that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be 
so coercive as to . . . [be] unconstitutional.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987); see also 
supra notes 39, 56 (noting no congressional fact-finding on the coercion issue); infra note 101 
(discussing Court’s Spending Clause ruling). 
83  See Koppelman, supra note 5 (contending that “[t]he first sustained legal argument” against the 
ACA was published in December 2009). 
84  This applies to the Spending Clause as well as the Commerce Clause. For example, Congress 
made no effort to find facts that the Medicaid condition was noncoercive. See supra notes 39, 42, 56; see 
also supra note 41 (noting that Commerce Clause fact-finding could be pursued at no political cost to 
Democrats). 
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salience. Specifically, it took the launching of constitutional challenges to 
the ACA by more than twenty Republican governors and attorneys general 
and the invalidation of the statute by two federal district courts to create the 
type of issue salience that compelled Congress to hold constitutional 
hearings on the statute.85 Before that time, the roadblocks to constitutional 
deliberation were sufficiently potent to prevent lawmakers from 
meaningfully considering possible constitutional challenges to the statute. 
To start, congressional Democrats were strongly disinclined to hold 
hearings about the ACA’s constitutionality. In addition to the above-
discussed roadblocks, Democratic leaders could not risk their very fragile 
coalition by allowing bill opponents to use constitutional hearings as a 
vehicle to slow down momentum for the bill.86 Moreover, by the summer of 
2009 (several months before the last hearings on the ACA), congressional 
Democrats were on notice that bill opponents would oppose the bill on 
constitutional grounds. From July to September 2009, opinion pieces in the 
Washington Post and Wall Street Journal and an online debate in Politico 
all flagged potential constitutional problems with the ACA.87 These opinion 
pieces, among other things, argued that “[t]he federal government does not 
have the power to regulate Americans simply because they are there”88 and 
that “Congress would have to explain how not doing 
something . . . implicated interstate commerce.”89 By the fall of 2009, 
congressional Democrats were well aware that the bill would be subject to a 
fierce constitutional attack both in the courts and on the campaign trail, 
 
85  See Klein, supra note 6 (noting these and other factors); see also Jack M. Balkin, From off the 
Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-
mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ (highlighting the import of unified Republican opposition 
to the bill, including the litigation challenge by Republican attorneys general). 
86  See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing steps that Speaker Pelosi and Majority 
Leader Reid took to keep the Democratic coalition intact); see also Chris Frates, Ben Nelson’s Medicaid 
Deal, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2009, 9:53 AM), http://www.politico.com/livepulse/1209/Ben_Nelsons_
Medicaid_deal.html (noting that Democratic leaders—in order to keep Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson as 
part of their coalition—modified the bill so that the federal government would pay for Nebraska’s 
Medicaid costs under the ACA). 
87  See JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING 
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2009) [hereinafter CRS 
REPORT]; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Illegal Health Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2009, at 
A15; Healthcare: Is “Mandatory Insurance” Unconstitutional?, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/healthcare-reform-constitutionality.html; Andrew P. Napolitano, 
Health-Care Reform and the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:57 AM), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203917304574412793406386548.html. 
88  Rivkin & Casey, supra note 87. 
89  Koppelman, supra note 5 (quoting a July 10, 2009 Federalist Society paper by Peter Urbanowicz 
and Dennis G. Smith). 
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where Republicans (buoyed by Tea Party opposition to the ACA) would 
trash the bill as unconstitutional governmental overreaching.90 
Against this background, congressional Democrats should have known 
of potential constitutional challenges to the Act, including the action–
inaction distinction that proved central to the Commerce Clause ruling in 
NFIB.91 At the same time, these constitutional arguments—while politically 
strong—were not sufficiently salient to compel an otherwise reluctant 
Congress to hold constitutional hearings or meaningfully debate the Act’s 
constitutionality. Instead, reflecting Congress’s general disinterest in 
constitutional questions, Democratic lawmakers made no efforts to use 
existing hearings to find facts that would strengthen the Act’s constitutional 
foundations.92 Lawmakers, moreover, made no formal reference in the ACA 
to the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Spending 
Clause, or Congress’s taxing power. Even more striking, Republican 
lawmakers launched only a half-hearted attempt to cast doubt on the ACA’s 
constitutionality; they focused, instead, on the policy issues that seemed 
politically salient at the time.93 
By February 2011 (almost one year after enactment of the ACA), the 
bill’s constitutionality was sufficiently salient to prompt House and Senate 
hearings on the ACA’s constitutionality.94 By this time, there was great 
 
90  For a discussion of Tea Party opposition to the bill, see John Fritze et al., The Health Care Bill’s 
8 Key Moments, USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2010, 11:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2010-03-25-health-care-moments_N.htm. For a discussion of Tea Party efforts to link their opposition to 
the ACA and other governmental programs with their vision of constitutional federalism, see Ilya 
Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300 
(2011); Zietlow, supra note 2, at 1367–68, 1395–97; Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution 
and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/
2011/01/17/110117crat_atlarge_lepore; and Adam J. White, The Tea Party’s Constitution, WKLY. 
STANDARD (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/tea-party-s-constitution_590449.
html. 
91  Some have argued that congressional Democrats should have known about this argument before 
proposing the individual mandate. Specifically, when the Clinton White House proposed a requirement 
that all businesses provide health insurance, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by David Rivkin 
and Lee Casey arguing that such a mandate impermissibly forced people who were doing nothing to act. 
See James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1 
(late edition). At the same time, I do not think Congress should be expected to know about arguments 
that were made sixteen years earlier. 
92  See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
93  See supra notes 58–59. 
94  In addition to the two hearings explicitly about the constitutionality of the ACA, there were 
mentions of the ACA’s constitutionality in twenty other hearings from March 26, 2010, to December 31, 
2011. This number was based on a search of the LEXIS CQ Transcription database and the Federal 
News Service database. See Dingledy, supra note 46. During this same period, a search of the 
Congressional Record resulted in 220 hits. The search was: “(affordable care act and (constitution! Or 
unconstitution!) and section (house or senate and not digest)).” For additional discussion of the specific 
questions asked in hearings and statements made on the floor of Congress, see Memorandum from Brian 
Kelley, Research Assistant, to author (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with the Northwestern University Law 
Review). Finally, Democratic leadership (in both the House and Senate, including leaders of committees 
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interest in Congress and throughout the country in the constitutionality of 
the Act—thanks to the confluence of federal court rulings against the ACA, 
the Tea Party fueled Republican takeover of the House, the efforts of 
Republican party officials to challenge the ACA in court, and the media 
attention attendant to all these developments.95 Furthermore, since the ACA 
was law, there was little reason (in the still-Democratic controlled Senate) 
for party leaders to resist such hearings.96 
 
 * * * 
 
Congress’s failure to think about the Constitution when enacting the 
ACA is hardly surprising. For reasons detailed in the first two Parts of this 
Essay, this failure is a byproduct of party polarization, the absence of a 
federalism constituency in Congress, and Congress’s disinclination to 
pursue collective goods like constitutional interpretation. Indeed, even 
though Congress was on notice of potential constitutional challenges to the 
ACA, the constitutional issue was of little salience to either Democratic or 
Republican lawmakers at the time of the ACA’s enactment (as revealed in 
the failure of legislative debates to seriously consider the constitutional 
question). Instead, it was outside-the-D.C.-beltway forces that transformed 
the ACA’s constitutionality into a politically salient issue, namely, the 
efforts of Republican governors and attorneys general who challenged the 
ACA, the Tea Party and its contribution to the 2010 Republican takeover of 
the House, and the two federal district courts that found the ACA 
unconstitutional. 
III. CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM97 
The question remains: What does my case study of the ACA suggest 
about the Court’s role in reviewing congressional decisionmaking on 
federalism issues? In this concluding Part, I will address this issue—
suggesting that the judiciary is the only branch of government that will 
police federalism. And while I personally disagree with the five Justices 
who thought that the Commerce Clause did not back up the ACA, I do think 
it is the Supreme Court’s responsibility to impose some boundary-control 
 
of relevant jurisdiction) and more than one hundred Republicans joined one or more of several amicus 
briefs on the constitutionality of the ACA before the federal courts of appeal. See id. 
95  See Balkin, supra note 85; Klein, supra note 6. 
96  There is good reason to think that House and Senate Judiciary Committee members wanted to 
hold hearings on the ACA’s constitutionality, for these committees are dominated by policy-oriented 
lawyers personally interested in constitutional questions. Devins, supra note 2, at 778–79. On the House 
side, the Republican takeover of the House also fueled such hearings (so that the Republican party could 
beat its drum regarding the constitutionality of the ACA). See supra notes 60–61. 
97  The title of this Part is drawn from Devins, supra note 8. The second paragraph of this Part is 
drawn from id. at 136–37. 
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limits on Congress. Indeed, against the backdrop of congressional 
inattention to the Constitution, including constitutional fact-finding, it is 
hard to find fault with the five Justices who wanted to slap Congress (even 
if another form of boundary control might have been preferable).98 
Congress, as suggested in Part II, cannot police itself on federalism-
related issues. Voters, interest groups, and political parties look to 
democratic outlets to pursue favored policy initiatives. And since the first-
order policy priorities of interest groups are sometimes served by judicial 
standards that facilitate Congress’s expansionist tendencies, there is no 
interest group that will push for a narrowing construction of Congress’s 
commerce power.99 In other words, unless judicial interpretations foreclose 
the pursuit of first-order policy priorities, it is unlikely that lawmakers will 
formally and consistently embrace a broad theory of federalism. 
How then should the Court police Congress’s exercise of its commerce 
power? One approach is to rely on fact-dependent standards; another is to 
place limits on Congress through boundary-control rules that would deem 
some federalism-related issues to be questions of law, not fact.100 For 
reasons I have detailed elsewhere, I think fact-dependent standards do not 
operate as meaningful constraints on Congress’s commerce power. With no 
federalism constituency in Congress, there is little reason to think that 
Congress will take fact-finding seriously, and courts are ill equipped to 
second-guess Congress’s findings.101 
In NFIB, five of the Justices made use of a boundary-control rule to 
limit Congress’s commerce power.102 Concluding that the mandate “directs 
 
98  For additional discussion, see infra notes 105–06. 
99  See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 8; Whittington, supra note 69, at 509–18. 
100  An example of a fact-dependent standard is the “affecting commerce” standard that the Court 
deployed in the 1937 decision, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 6 (1937). An 
example of a boundary-control rule is the requirement that Congress’s commerce power is limited to 
economic activity, that is, “the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce.” 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
101  See Devins, supra note 75, at 1198–1200. It is less certain whether Congress could insulate 
factual assertions about whether conditions on federal spending are coercive. For the Commerce Clause, 
questions about whether activities, for example, do “affect interstate commerce” seem nationwide in 
scope and, as such, best answered by the national legislature. On the other hand, questions about 
coercion are arguably best answered by the states subject to the choice of whether to accept or forego 
conditions on federal funds. 
102  See James B. Stewart, An Important New Limit on the Commerce Clause, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 
2012, 2:16 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/an-important-new-limit-on-the-
commerce-clause/. For a variety of reasons, there is some question as to whether the opinions of these 
five Justices constitute a binding precedent on Congress’s commerce power. See Walter Dellinger, 
Supreme Court Year in Review—Entry 15: Why This Is Now Chief Justice Roberts’ Court, SLATE (June 
28, 2012, 1:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/
2012/_supreme_court_year_in_review/supreme_court_upholds_obamacare_why_this_is_now_roberts_c
ourt_.html (noting that there was no opinion in which five Justices joined); William A. Jacobson, What 
If That Huge Conservative Doctrinal Achievement Was Mere Dicta?, LEGAL INSURRECTION (June 29, 
2012, 4:36 PM), http://legalinsurrection.com/2012/06/what-if-that-huge-conservative-doctrinal-
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the creation of commerce” and that “[c]onstruing the Commerce Clause to 
permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing 
nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional 
authority,”103 these Justices embraced the action–inaction distinction 
advanced by critics of the law. Through this boundary control, Congress 
could regulate but not create commerce. 
That the Court would want to create some type of boundary control in 
the ACA case seems sensible. Congress made no effort to find facts 
showing that the uninsured participate in the national health marketplace.104 
Likewise, there are no findings that the individual mandate is “necessary 
and proper” to a well-functioning national health insurance system.105 
Finally, the bill does not even reference the Necessary and Proper Clause or 
Congress’s powers over commerce, spending, and taxation.106 Given the 
import of the bill, the uniqueness of the mandate, and the fact that Congress 
had reason to know that the bill would be subject to a serious constitutional 
challenge, Congress’s failure to think about the Constitution seems 
especially egregious. 
None of this is to say that the Court needed to draw a boundary in the 
ACA case or that the boundary it drew was correct.107 At the same time, 
 
achievement-was-mere-dicta/ (noting that the Commerce Clause holding was not essential to Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion). 
103  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. 
at 2587 (majority opinion). 
104  See sources cited supra note 44. 
105  This type of finding would correspond to Justice Scalia’s invocation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in a 2005 ruling upholding a federal ban on medical marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a discussion of the link between Justice Scalia’s Raich 
concurrence and the ACA, see CRS REPORT, supra note 87, at 8 & n.41. 
106  Congress, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his opinion, is under no formal obligation to cite 
these powers. See supra note 28. At the same time, it cannot help a bill’s chances when its defenders—
academic amici and the Department of Justice—must invest substantial effort in explaining why, for 
example, “[t]he Taxation Clause does not require Congress to use any particular labels or expressly 
invoke the taxation power.” Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Defendant-Appellant at 16, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-11021), 2011 WL 1461597, at *16. 
107  I think both that the uninsured participate in the national health marketplace and that it is 
“necessary and proper” to impose costs on the uninsured as part of a national regulatory insurance 
scheme that requires insurance companies to provide coverage to individuals with preexisting 
conditions. From my vantage, the constitutional objection to the individual mandate is much more about 
the liberty interest “not to participate” than about the Commerce Clause. For this very reason, I signed a 
brief supporting the individual mandate as an exercise of Congress’s commerce power. See Brief of Law 
Professors Barry Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and 
Reversal on the Minimum-Coverage Provision Issue, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 
No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 160237. Moreover, the Court could have imposed a 
somewhat different boundary on the Commerce Clause—allowing Congress to create incentives to 
participate in one or another market but rejecting the idea that Congress could compel mandatory 
participation. This suggestion was advanced by Walter Dellinger as a way for the Court to place limits 
on Congress while upholding the mandate under the commerce power. See Walter Dellinger, Supreme 
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Congress’s failures are striking and the Court’s efforts to limit Congress 
understandable. Sadly, for reasons detailed in Parts I and II of this Essay, 
there is little reason to think that Congress will change its practices. 
Lawmaker disinterest in the pursuit of common goods like constitutional 
interpretation and the absence of a federalism constituency will remain 
substantial roadblocks to constitutional review by Congress. Moreover, 
party polarization exacerbates these roadblocks; today’s Congress is far less 
interested in the Constitution than earlier Congresses. The ACA is a product 
of its times, and judicial limits on congressional power seem sensible in this 
context. 
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